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A BREEDING GROUND FOR REVENUE RELIABILITY? CAMEROONIAN VETERINARY AGENTS AND 
TAX OFFICIALS IN THE FACE OF TAX REFORM 
José-María Muñoz  
 
As	in	most	other	sub-Saharan	African	countries,	but	in	ways	that	reflect	national	particularities	
and	governmental	priorities,	the	face	of	the	tax	administration	in	Cameroon	began	to	change	markedly	
in	the	1990s.	Yet,	state	officials	and	taxpayers	on	the	ground	have	experienced	not	so	much	an	
overarching	reform	package	as	a	succession	of	largely	small	and	ostensibly	technical	changes	to	law,	
organization,	and	procedure.	Based	on	ethnographic	research	in	Adamaoua,	one	of	Cameroon’s	three	
northern	provinces,	this	article	analyzes	in	detail	one	such	relatively	modest	component	of	the	effort	to	
reform	the	tax	administration.1	It	explores	the	effects	of	a	recent	program	aimed	at	improving	the	
efficiency	of	a	segment	of	the	Cameroonian	state’s	revenue-raising	activity	and	places	the	scope	of	this	
program	within	a	broader	universe	of	administrative	practice.		
By	looking	into	a	Cameroonian	case	in	which	the	spheres	of	authority	of	different	branches	of	
the	state	administration	were	reconfigured,	I	intend	to	contribute	to	two	bodies	of	scholarship:	a	still	
sparse	literature	that	approaches	the	workings	of	tax	systems	and	their	reform	as	ethnographic	objects,	
on	the	one	hand;	and	works	that	analyze	the	exercise	of	public	authority	in	present-day	sub-Saharan	
Africa,	on	the	other.	Despite	its	obvious	implications	for	the	questions	of	democracy	(Guyer	1992)	and	
																																								 																				
1	These	pages	are	based	on	fourteen	months	of	fieldwork	during	several	research	trips	between	July	2003	and	November	2004.	
They	draw	on	participant	observation	and	semi-structured	interviews	with	numerous	state	officials	and	over	ninety	business	
owners	working	in	Adamaoua	Province.	Research	took	place	within	the	framework	of	a	British	Economic	and	Social	Research	
Council-funded	project.	I	am	deeply	indebted	to	the	two	other	members	of	the	research	team,	Philip	Burnham	(principal	
investigator)	and	Martial	Massike	(research	assistant).	I	would	also	like	to	thank	Thomas	Bierschenk,	Jean-Pierre	Olivier	de	
Sardan,	and	Giorgio	Blundo	for	their	comments	on	earlier	versions	of	this	article.	
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state	building	(Bräutigam	2009),	taxation	has	received	only	limited	ethnographic	attention	in	sub-
Saharan	Africa.	The	reform	of	tax	administration	has	certainly	been	the	object	of	intense	debate	and	
scrutiny,	since	tax	authorities	have	long	been	held	to	be	a	strategic	choice	for	attempts	at	reforming	
state	bureaucracy.2		This	literature,	however,	has	placed	much	of	its	emphasis	on	the	assessment	of	
state	(in)effectiveness	in	mobilizing	revenue	(Stotsky	and	WoldeMariam	1997;	Chambas	2005;	Gupta	
and	Tareq	2008)	and	the	potential	for	privatization	in	this	domain	(Kiser	and	Sacks	2009).	What	
economists	call	the	“tax	effort”	is	generally	measured	by	the	ratio	of	tax	revenue	to	GDP.	As	Ole	
Therkildsen	has	noted,	the	gap	between	such	figures	and	the	empirical	research	required	to	interpret	
them,	remains	striking,	both	as	regards	policies	and	administrative	action	and	taxpayers’	behavior	
(Therkildsen	2001).		
Recent	studies	have	demonstrated	how	a	transnational	epistemic	community	of	tax	experts	has	
played	a	major	part	in	the	design	of	recipes	to	improve	tax	administration	in	developing	countries	
(Fjeldstad	and	Moore	2009a).3	In	spite	of	this	strong	international	consensus	on	what	the	centerpieces	
of	tax	reform	should	be,	the	anthropology	of	policy	in	this	domain	is	still	in	its	infancy.	“Tax	
administration	is	tax	policy”	is	an	often	quoted	adage	in	the	literature	(see,	for	example,	Bird	and	
Casanegra	de	Jantscher	1992).	Notwithstanding	the	valuable	invitation	it	contains	to	go	beyond	
programmatic	policy	formulations,	from	a	heuristic	point	of	view	it	is	productive	to	make	a	distinction	
between	general	policy	“frameworks”	and	their	“mobilizing	metaphors,”	on	the	one	hand,	and	what	is	
generally	subsumed	under	“policy	implementation,”	on	the	other	(Shore	and	Wright	1997;	see	also	
																																								 																				
2	In	the	early	1960s,	for	example,	Nicholas	Kaldor	(1963)	published	an	influential	article	in	Foreign	Affairs	arguing	that	if	new	
nations	concentrated	their	efforts	on	revenue	(tax	and	customs)	authorities,	they	would	secure	the	means	to	develop	an	
effective	bureaucracy	across	different	branches	of	the	administration.		
3	Many	of	the	principles	inspiring	such	reforms	derive	from	New	Public	Management	ideas	(see,	for	example,	Manning	2001).	
This	school	of	thought	argues	for	political	and	managerial	autonomy	as	a	remedy	for	“many	of	problems	that	plague	the	public	
sector,	such	as	multiple	layers	of	principal	and	agents,	byzantine	rules,	low	pay,	and	poor	and	distorted	incentives,	which	all	
contribute	to	unfair	and	inefficient	revenue	collection”	(Therkildsen	2004:	60).	The	trace	of	these	ideas	is	palpable	in	many	of	
the	changes	introduced	in	countries	like	Cameroon,	such	as	the	adoption	of	business-like	management	rules	and	an	emphasis	
on	the	organizational	separation	of	tax	policy	and	tax	collection.	However,	actual	policies	and	measures	have	often	departed	
from	such	principles	(Fjeldstad	and	Moore	2009b).		
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Mosse	2004).	Accordingly,	the	following	pages	discuss	the	general	contours	of	the	administrative	
reforms	in	Cameroon	before	exploring	the	transformative	potential	of	such	reforms	through	a	specific	
example.					
As	noted,	this	article	is	also	intended	as	a	contribution	to	scholarship	on	the	exercise	of	public	
authority	in	present-day	sub-Saharan	Africa.	Here	I	follow	in	the	footsteps	of	Bierschenk	and	Olivier	de	
Sardan’s	disection	of	the	“polycentric”	political	arenas	in	rural	Benin	during	the	era	of	democratization	
and	decentralization	(1998).	In	a	somewhat	different	vein,	Achille	Mbembe,	in	his	influential	discussion	
on	“private	indirect	government,”	referred	to	the	“fragmentation	of	public	authority”	as	a	major	
historical	process	that	should	be	at	the	center	of	the	analytical	questions	that	he	groups	under	the	
broad	term	of	“fiscality.”4	An	increasing	number	of	works	have	taken	heed	of	such	lines	of	inquiry,	
combining	an	explicit	focus	on	“the	substantive	activity	of	competing	political	organizations	as	they	
exercise	public	authority”	with	the	belief	that	these	matters	are	“not	beyond	detailed	and	vivid	
empirical	analysis”	(Lund	2006a:	675,	682).	In	this	light,	the	“the	practical	form	of	public	authority”	
appears	as	“composite	and	chimerical”	(Lund	2006b:	689).	This	recent	strand	of	research	is	also	a	
reaction	to	a	prevalent	paradigm	of	state	formation	in	Africa	that,	as	Olivier	de	Sardan	(2005)	points	out,	
excelled	in	the	art	of	labeling	the	African	state	without	empirically	exploring	its	daily	functioning	and	
changing	bureaucratic	system.5	My	article	finds	its	rationale	in	this	larger	endeavor	to	document	how	
state	officials	and	other	power	brokers—with	varying	degrees	of	self-awareness	and	for	a	broad	range	
of	ends—mediate	between	the	state	and	its	citizen-subjects.	This	is	particularly	important	when,	as	is	
																																								 																				
4	Bierschenk	and	Olivier	de	Sardan	approach	the	historical	dimension	of	such	fragmentation	in	terms	of	“sedimentation”	and	
empilement	(superimposition)	(2003:	152).	Mbembe	uses	fiscality	as	a	shorthand	for	“[the]	appropriation	of	means	of	
livelihood,	[the]	allocation	of	profits,	the	types	of	extraction	thus	required,	and	the	concentration	of	coercion	involved”	(2001:	
66).	In	this	work,	Mbembe	also	underscores	the	erosion	of	the	mobilizing	power	of	metaphors	such	as	“public	interest”	and	
“common	good,”	a	crucial	development	shaping	Cameroon’s	political	and	economic	landscape	in	the	last	two	decades.	
5	See	also	Blundo	2006:	21-22.	As	regards	Bayart’s	rhizome	state	(Bayart	1993),	ethnographers	working	in	Cameroon,	which	was	
the	main	source	of	inspiration	for	the	model,	observed	early	on	that	it	had	problems	accounting	for	processes	that	were	taking	
place	in	politically	peripheral	locations	(Geschiere	1986:	87,	100;	Burnham	1996:	146-147).		
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the	case	of	the	following	pages,	we	grapple	with	reforms	that	project	an	image	of	the	state	as	a	unitary	
organization	in	the	legal-bureaucratic	sense,	driven	by	deliberate	projects	and	strategies.		
Technologies	of	taxation	and	the	exercise	of	public	authority	occupy	a	prominent	place	in	Janet	
Roitman’s	work	on	economic	regulation	in	the	Lake	Chad	Basin	(2005a).6	For	my	purposes	here,	what	
she	terms	the	“pluralization	of	figures	of	regulatory	authority”	is	of	particular	interest.	Roitman	
elaborates	on	this	notion	as	follows:			
Effective	authority	over	[commercial	and	financial]	exchanges	[in	the	Chad	Basin]	and	the	
surpluses	they	generate	is	exercised	by	an	amalgam	of	personalities	associated	with	state	
bureaucracy,	the	merchant	elite,	the	military,	and	nonstate	militia	groups…	They	manage	to	
regulate	local	populations	and	define	access	to	material	resources	and	wealth,	to	tax	the	profits	
of	economic	relationships,	and	to	establish	preeminent	authority	over	certain	sectors	of	
economic	activity	(ibid.:	18).	
	
From	my	perspective,	the	problem	is	that	in	Roitman’s	account	the	“personalities”	whom	we	are	told	
exercise	authority	seemingly	dissolve	in	the	alchemical	image	of	the	amalgam	(or	in	a	“military-
commercial	nexus”	that	she	uses	interchangeably).	In	her	book	as	well	as	in	her	numerous	articles,	such	
personalities	often	times	do	not	get	past	the	state	of	faceless	silhouettes	(see,	for	example,	Roitman	
2004,	2005b,	2006,	2007,	2008).	This	work	complements	Roitman’s	concern	with	how	people	establish	
“truths”	about	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	its	subjects	by	drawing	the	readers’	attention	to	
the	competition	for	authority	between	two	branches	of	Cameroon’s	state	bureaucracy.		
	
1.	Reforming	tax	administration	in	Cameroon	
Reforms	in	sub-Saharan	Africa	have	placed	many	government	employees	in	the	dual	position	of	
agents	and	objects	of	reform,	a	Janus-faced	role	that	has	not	failed	to	generate	ambiguities	and	
paradoxes.	Cameroon	has	had	its	share	of	both,	as	will	become	apparent	in	the	analysis	of	the	
																																								 																				
6	In	Roitman’s	usage	the	Lake	Chad	Basin	is	an	admittedly	vague	label	that	includes	Adamoua	Province,	the	location	where	I	
conducted	most	of	my	fieldwork	(Roitman	2005a:	5n.7).	
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Programme	de	Sécurisation	des	Recettes	de	l’Elevage	et	la	Pêche	(PSREP,	Program	for	Improved	
Revenue	Reliability	in	the	Animal	Husbandry	and	Fisheries	Sector).	The	PSREP	is	a	modest	addition	to	an	
open-ended	series	of	ambitious	administrative	reforms	undertaken	by	the	government	since	1988,	
when	it	adopted	its	first	International	Monetary	Fund-supported	program.		
In	the	early	years	of	structural	adjustment,	marked	by	the	emphasis	on	the	need	to	cut	public	
spending	to	achieve	macroeconomic	stability,	administrative	reform	was	largely	understood	in	terms	of	
reducing	the	state	payroll	through	layoffs	and	salary	cuts.	Even	within	these	narrowly	defined	terms,	a	
regime	trying	to	navigate	the	troubled	transition	to	multiparty	politics	showed	itself	unable	and	
unwilling	to	implement	such	measures.	7	Their	resistance	by	a	civil	service	that	Jean-François	Bayart	
(1985:	216),	in	his	groundbreaking	analysis	of	the	Cameroonian	state,	had	singled	out	as	the	“main	social	
force	in	the	country,”	is	anything	but	surprising.8	It	was	only	in	1993	when,	unable	to	cover	the	public	
wage	bill,	the	government	decided	to	take	the	drastic	step	of	reducing	the	salaries	of	civil	servants.9		The	
scope	of	reform	was	broadened	in	1994	with	the	introduction	of	a	new	legal	framework	aimed	at	
improving	civil	service	efficiency.10	While	the	new	statute	for	state	employees	proclaimed	the	need	of	
constantly	assessing	performance,	the	mechanisms	of	assessment	and	the	system	of	rewards	and	
penalties	remained	unspecified	(Ngouo	1997).	Furthermore,	although	it	listed	the	devotion	to	the	
service	as	one	of	the	civil	servants’	obligations	(article	15),	it	also	explicitly	accepted	their	parallel	
																																								 																				
7	Operation	ANTILOPE	(National	Implementation	of	Computerized	Management	and	Logistics	of	State	Personnel)	was	launched	
in	1987.	The	operation’s	main	goal,	to	clean	up	the	state	payroll	of	ghost	civil	servants,	proved	to	lie	beyond	reach.	The	
government	has	been	grappling	with	this	problem	for	more	than	two	decades	now.	As	late	as	November	2008,	the	minister	of	
public	service	told	national	deputies	that	5,324	new	cases	of	fictive	employees	and	pensioners	had	been	detected.	
8	In	the	following	years	of	crisis	and	adjustment,	the	social	and	political	position	of	government	officials	was	significantly	
eroded.	Yet,	Bayart’s	contention	that	public	office	is	“indissolubly	tied	to	a	position	of	enrichment	by	the	personal	advantages	
attached	to	it,”	(Bayart	1985:	329)	although	referring	to	a	pre-structural	adjustment	era,	is	still	pertinent	today.	
9	In	January	1993,	salaries	were	reduced	by	15	percent	on	average,	excluding	police	and	military	personnel.	Later	that	year,	in	
November,	there	was	an	additional	reduction	of	32	percent.	The	1994	CFA	franc	devaluation	further	eroded	their	economic	
position.	Senior	civil	servants,	for	example,	saw	their	real	wages	fall	by	75-80	percent	from	1992	to	1995	(World	Bank	2001:	4).	
In	the	last	three	decades,	late	payment	of	civil	servants’	salaries	has	also	become	commonplace.		
10	Statut	Général	de	la	Fonction	Publique	de	l’Etat,	contained	in	decree	1994/117,	of	October	7,	1994.	The	decree	was	drafted	
with	the	United	Nations	Development	Program’s	active	participation	(UNDP	1994).	The	decree	opened	the	door	for	an	attempt	
to	reduce	the	number	of	civil	servants	in	30,000	through	voluntary	departure	and	early	retirement,	in	fulfilment	of	conditions	
imposed	by	the	World	Bank	(Bayie	Kamanda	1999)	
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involvement	in	private	activities	(article	37),	an	unprecedented	formal	sanction	of	the	widespread	
practice	of	“straddling”	that	did	not	pass	unnoticed	to	critics	(Sindjoun	1994:	64;	Nanga	1999:	5).	
Indeed,	far	from	disappearing,	as	some	reformers	had	anticipated,	straddling	(the	seeking	of	economic	
advantage	by	the	simultaneous	involvement	in	state	employment	and	private	business)	continued	
unabated	and	extended	to	the	lower	ranks	of	the	civil	service	(Geschiere	and	Konings	1993).		
From	1994,	numerous	governmental	initiatives	tackling	different	aspects	of	the	state	
organizational	structure	have	seen	the	light,	most	of	them	placed	under	the	mantle	of	the	“good	
governance”	agenda	and	largely	drawing	their	inspiration	from	New	Public	Management	ideas	(see	
Ngouo	2000;	Tamekou	2008).	These	include	an	overarching	National	Governance	Program	(that	has	
known	two	phases,	2000-2004	and	2006-2010),11	a	Computer	System	for	the	Integrated	Management	of		
State	Personnel	and	Payroll	(SIGIPES),12	an	Administrative	Procedure	Handbooks	(MPA)	at	the	ministerial	
level,	a	Project	for	the	Introduction	of	Performance	Standards	(PINORAC),	and	a	Program	for	the	
Modernization	of	the	Administration	through	Performance-based	Management	(PROMAGAR).		
These	programs	offer	ample	room	for	“the	dramatization	(théâtralisation)	of	technocratic	and	
legal-rational	discourse”	(Sindjoun1994:	65).	Each	new	initiative	acknowledges	the	contributions	and	the	
shortcomings	of	previous	attempts.	Earlier	efforts	have	represented	improvements	but	further	progress	
is	needed—and	often	mandated	by	Cameroon’s	international	“partners.”	Each	new	initiative	contains	
																																								 																				
11	The	NGP	was	first	announced	by	President	Biya	in	his	1996	New	Year’s	Eve	speech	but	was	not	approved	by	him	until	2000.	A	
2004	critical	evaluation	gave	the	impetus	for	a	reformulation	of	the	program	in	2005.	The	UNDP	participated	in	the	program’s	
conception	at	both	stages.	Progress	in	achieving	the	NGP’s	goals	has	been	closely	monitored	by	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF.	It	
is	also	claimed	to	have	played	an	important	role	in	determining	when	Cameroon	reached	the	Highly	Indebted	Poor	Countries	
initiative’s	“completion	point”	that	gives	access	to	substantial	foreign	debt	relief	(Charlier	and	N’Cho-Oguie	2009).	This	finally	
took	place	on	April	28,	2006.	
12	SIGIPES	has	been	probably	the	single	initiative	that	has	attracted	more	attention	and	controversy.	It	was	initially	conceived	in	
1992	by	the	then	minister	of	public	service,	Garga	Haman	Adji,	who	was	soon	to	resign.	After	several	false	starts,	its	pilot	phase,	
which	focused	on	four	strategic	ministries	(Economy	and	Finance,	Health,	Education,	and	Civil	Service),	began	in	2002	(SIGIPES	
2005;	Kenhago	Tazo	2003).	In	December	2005,	the	system’s	tortuous	implementation	made	the	headlines	of	the	national	press	
(for	a	sample,	see	La	Nouvelle	Expression,	December	8,	2005;	Le	Messager,	December	12,	2005).	Alleged	corruption	in	the	
provision	of	technical	support	by	outside	contractors	motivated	the	suspension	of	the	Ministry	of	Public	Service	and	
Administrative	Reform’s	permanent	secretary	and	its	top	technical	advisor	for	“dishonesty	and	serious	breach	of	trust.”	SIGIPES	
is	now	in	the	process	of	being	extended	to	several	other	ministries.		
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the	promise	that	things	will	be	different	thereafter.	As	the	burden	of	acknowledged	past	“failures”	
increases,	the	leaps	of	faith	required	to	keep	the	flame	of	reform	alive	are	bigger.	The	recent	
PROMAGAR,	for	example,	“has	not	aroused	special	enthusiasm,”	the	ruling	party’s	newsletter	told	its	
readers,	because	the	“beautiful	promises”	contained	in	“similar	projects,	some	still	in	place	and	others	
already	buried,”	have	come	to	nothing	engulfed	by	“centrifugal	forces”	stemming	from	an	
“irréformable”	civil	service.13	Aspects	of	this	dynamic	are	captured	in	what	Nicolas	van	de	Walle	(2001),	
building	on	Hellman’s	notion	of	“partial	reform	syndrome”	(1998),	has	called	the	“politics	of	permanent	
crisis.”	In	van	de	Walle’s	formulation,	however,	lingers	the	desire	for	an	illusory	comprehensive	reform,	
on	whose	main	lines	everyone	purportedly	agrees	and	which	nobody	seems	capable	of	implementing.	
As	suggested	by	Béatrice	Hibou	(2006:	297)	in	her	work	on	the	Tunisian	regime,	we	should	be	advised	
not	to	discard	the	possibility	that	these	“reforms	in	perpetuity”	are	what	constitutes	the	“success	of	
reformism.”	Be	it	as	it	may,	learning	to	coexist	with	reform	has	become	part	of	the	social	condition	of	
Cameroonian	civil	servants.14		
Because	 of	 its	 critical	 role	 in	 revenue	 generation	 and	 its	 potential	 to	 showcase	 improved	
efficiency,	the	tax	administration	has	figured	prominently	in	the	attempts	to	reorganize	the	civil	service.	
It	was	 claimed	 that	 revenue	offered	a	 yardstick	 to	assess	administrative	efficiency	 that	was	 lacking	 in	
other	areas	of	administrative	action.15	As	a	 result,	 the	 face	of	 the	tax	administration	 in	Cameroon	has	
changed	markedly	since	the	mid-1990s.	As	a	senior	official,	who	today	manages	the	big	taxpayers’	unit,	
writes	 with	 a	 touch	 of	 pride,	 “Within	 the	 Cameroonian	 administration	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	 Direction	
Générale	 des	 Impôts	 (DGI,	 the	 national	 tax	 authority)	 is	 unique	 in	 having	 firmly	 and	 irreversibly	
embarked	on	the	hazardous	road	to	performance-based	management”	(Evina	Obam	2005:	24).	Changes	
																																								 																				
13	“L’administration	dans	le	bourbier	de	sa	réforme,”	L’Action,	October	1,	2008.	
14	Of	course,	this	is	far	from	being	the	exclusive	trait	of	Cameroonian	or	African	civil	services.	An	illustrious	specialist	in	the	
workings	of	the	French	administration,	for	example,	talked	about	the	“permanent	failure	of	reform”	in	the	former	metropolis	at	
roughly	the	same	time	that	the	above-mentioned	reforms	were	being	tried	out	in	Cameroon	(Crozier	1995).		
15	The	difficulties	involved	in	assessing	efficiency	on	the	basis	of	collected	revenue	are	nonetheless	daunting,	as	Marc	Raffinot	
(2001),	among	others,	has	convincingly	shown.		
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introduced	in	the	tax	administration,	however,	cannot	be	understood	in	isolation	from	the	overhaul	of	
the	tax	and	customs	system	more	generally.	Since	1994,	the	transformations	of	the	customs	regime	and	
of	personal	and	business	 taxation	have	been	substantial	and	 far-reaching.	These	 transformations	 took	
place	as	the	government	gradually	recovered	from	the	1991	villes	mortes	campaign,	a	wave	of	popular	
protests	that	contested	its	legitimacy	and	explicitly	called	for	tax	boycotts	(Takougang	and	Krieger	1998;	
Roitman	 2005).	 Revisions	 of	 the	 tax	 code	 included	 in	 1995	 the	 suppression	 of	 the	 head	 tax	 and	 the	
creation	of	a	specific	tax	for	persons	operating	outside	the	regulatory	framework	(impôt	libératoire)	and	
in	1998	the	introduction	of	a	value-added	tax	(VAT).		
These	changes	called	for	considerable	additional	efforts	 from	disaffected	state	officials,	whose	
salaries,	not	always	paid	on	time,	afforded	a	severely	diminished	standard	of	 living	after	the	1994	CFA	
franc	devaluation.	Not	only	were	their	administrative	services,	as	a	result	of	the	unevenly	implemented	
austerity	 measures	 of	 adjustment,	 lacking	 previously	 taken-for-granted	 resources	 but	 now	 they	
confronted	 a	 considerably	 enlarged	 pool	 of	 taxpayers	 subject	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 new	 tax	 regimes.	 This	
represented,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	more	 dossiers	 to	 be	 dealt	with	 by	 each	 agent	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 the	
urgent	need	to	catch	up	with	new	law.16	Indeed,	some	transitional	regulations	were	only	in	force	for	a	
few	years.	The	adoption	of	the	VAT	illustrates	the	difficulties	posed	by	these	constant	changes.	In	order	
to	 avoid	 the	 catastrophic	drop	 in	 revenue	 that	 its	 introduction	had	provoked	 in	African	 countries	 like	
Niger	(see	Barlow	and	Snyder	1994),	in	1994	the	Cameroonian	government	opted	for	a	transitory	tax	on	
commercial	 turnover	 (taxe	 sur	 le	 chiffre	 d’affaires)	 to	 replace	 the	 old	 tax	 on	 internal	 commercial	
turnover	 (impôt	sur	 le	chiffre	d’affaires	 intérieur).	After	a	mere	four	years	of	administrative	confusion,	
including	a	failed	attempt	to	privatize	its	collection	(Hibou	2004:	15),	this	new	TCA	was	then	replaced	by	
the	 VAT.	 All	 these	 novelties,	 in	 turn,	 increased	 the	 possibilities	 for	 manipulation	 of	 the	 regulatory	
																																								 																				
16	Among	the	most	striking	instances	I	witnessed	of	the	difficulties	this	entailed	in	practice,	were	several	meetings	I	attended	in	
the	context	of	the	tax	administration’s	attempts	to	“persuade”	cattle	traders	throughout	Adamaoua	to	fulfill	their	obligations.	
In	these	meetings,	tax	officials	repeatedly	invoked	outdated	regulations	that	had	been	overruled	by	more	recent	ones.	
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schemes	 at	 their	 disposal,	 in	 order	 to	 get	 an	 income	 on	 the	 side	 through	 collusive	 agreements	 with	
taxpayers	 and	 other	 extra-legal	 exactions.	 New	 regulations	 could	 be	 arbitrarily	 invoked	 to	 justify	
officials’	abuses.	
As	far	as	the	reforms	of	the	administration	itself	are	concerned,	a	senior	tax	official	in	
Adamaoua	aptly	summed	up	their	presiding	idea:	“We	are	now	compelled	to	deliver	in	terms	of	results,	
somewhat	like	the	private	[sector].”	At	the	provincial	and	district	levels,	the	system	relied	now	on	
annual	revenue	targets.17	Under	the	new	system,	tax	officials	also	receive	a	small	share	in	the	improved	
tax	payments	as	well	as	in	the	fines	and	penalties	levied.18	The	“managerial”	principles	governing	the	
operation	of	collection	and	audit	services	also	entailed,	at	least	rhetorically,	turning	taxpayers	into	
clients.	To	that	effect,	a	Programme	Contribuable-Partenaire	(Taxpayer-Partner	Program)	was	adopted.	
Since	2002,	taxpayers	can	address	a	single	interlocutor	at	the	district	level	in	the	figure	of	the	chef	de	
centre	des	impôts	(CCI,	head	of	the	tax	center),	who	takes	on	previously	separate	functions	such	as	
control,	audit	and	dispute	resolution.		
The	creation	of	the	CCI	also	reflects	a	move	from	a	system	organized	around	different	taxes	to	
one	organized	around	industries,	localities	and	groups	of	taxpayers,	which	is	consonant	with	widely	
followed	prescriptions	for	tax	reform	in	so-called	developing	countries	(Fjeldstad	and	Moore	2009a).	In	
fact,	it	was	largely	in	light	of	this	new	approach	that	the	initiative	on	which	this	article	focuses	was	
justified.	Indeed,	the	PSREP	was	one	among	several	programs	oriented	toward	improving	“revenue	
reliability”	(sécurisation	des	recettes),	that	is,	explicitly	aimed	at	increasing	the	tax	“productivity”	of	
certain	sectors.	With	the	active	encouragement	of	its	main	donors,	and	in	the	face	of	the	impending	
																																								 																				
17	In	November	2004,	during	my	fieldwork,	seven	chefs	de	centre	des	impôts	were	suspended	in	Yaoundé	and	Douala	for	
performing	below	the	set	targets	(see,	for	example,	Le	Messager,	November	19,	2004).	Among	business	circles,	voices	have	
been	raised	noting	that	the	pressure	put	on	CCI	to	reach	their	targets	has	resulted	in	a	more	repressive	outlook	of	the	tax	
authorities	(Monkam	et	al.	2003:	80)	
18 The	functioning	of	the	system	has	remained	strikingly	vague	and	largely	dealt	with	in	ministerial	circular	notes.	As	an	inside	
critic	has	written,	“At	the	DGI,	where	a	well-known	performance-based	management	system	under	the	name	of	DPO	(direction	
par	objectifs)	is	being	experimented,	no	formal	regulations	have	been	issued	making	the	contents	of	the	system	explicit”	(Evina	
Obam	2005:	12). 
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revenue	shortages	as	oil	production	declined,	the	Cameroonian	government	attempted	to	raise	revenue	
from	economic	sectors	or	categories	of	taxpayers	whose	poor	revenue	yields	could	be	blamed	to	a	large	
extent	on	administrative	deficiencies.	Animal	farming	and	fisheries,	and,	more	important	in	quantitative	
terms,	the	forestry	sector	(Programme	de	Sécurisation	des	Recettes	Forestières	[PSRF],	see	décret	no.	
99/370/PM,	of	March	19,	1999)	and	the	select	group	of	the	country’s	largest	firms	(Division	des	Grandes	
Entreprises	[DGE],	see	décret	no.	2003/165,	of	June	30,	2003)	were	obvious	candidates	for	a	specific	and	
more	efficient	tax	management.	In	this	regard,	the	role	of	French	technical	cooperation	has	been	
important	in	the	Cameroonian	case	and,	more	generally,	in	Francophone	Africa.	Thus,	for	example,	the	
same	team	of	French	consultants	that	helped	put	in	place	the	DGE	during	a	brief	stay	in	Cameroon	had	
Gabon	as	their	next	destination,	where	they	helped	establish	an	equivalent	unit.	The	PSREP	and	the	
PSRF	illustrate	as	well	another	important	goal	of	the	reforms:	enhanced	coordination	among	different	
agencies	acting	in	the	name	of	the	state.	In	these	two	cases,	it	concerned	relations	between	the	tax	
authorities	and,	respectively,	the	Ministry	of	Livestock,	Fisheries	and	Animal	Industries	(MINEPIA)	and	
the	Ministry	of	Forestry	and	Fauna.	Other	governmental	efforts	seek	improved	coordination	and	data-
sharing	among	tax,	customs,	and	social	security	authorities.19		In	what	follows,	an	account	of	how	the	
PSREP	was	implemented	in	Adamaoua	Province	documents	the	complexities	involved	in	translating	
administrative	reforms	into	effective	measures	in	local	contexts.		
	
2.	Veterinary	agents	and	tax	officials	in	Adamoua	Province	
The	PSREP	was	created	in	2000	by	a	prime	minister’s	decree	(décret	no.	2000/980/PM,	of	
December	8,	2000).	As	a	program	that	was	concerned	with	reorganizing	the	tax	administration	in	the	
																																								 																				
19	The	partnership	between	the	tax	authorities	and	the	Caisse	Nationale	de	Prévoyance	Sociale,	the	governmental	agency	in	
charge	of	the	social	security	system,	was	established	in	2001	(Law	no.	2001/017,	of	December	18,	2001).	Setting	up	a	Cellule	
Mixte	Impôts/Douanes	(customs/taxes	joint	unit)	had	to	wait	until	2005.	In	2007,	however,	in	light	of	its	failure	to	operate,	the	
national	commission	for	tax	reform	proposed	its	elimination.	
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animal	farming	and	fisheries	sector,	it	did	not	create	any	new	taxes.	It	simply	tried	to	involve	the	
Ministry	of	Economy	and	Finance	(MINEFI)	in	the	collection	of	certain	duties	(market	and	
slaughterhouse	fees	and	veterinary	certificates),	which	are	ordinarily	referred	to	as	“taxes”	and	had	
been	hitherto	the	exclusive	responsibility	of	MINEPIA	veterinary	agents.	Therefore,	at	the	core	of	the	
PSREP	was	the	issue	of	the	cooperation	between	two	branches	of	the	administration	with	different	
“local	professional	cultures”	but	similarly	involved	in	“privatizing”	their	bureaucratic	services	(see	Olivier	
de	Sardan	2001).	The	tensions	between	these	two	branches	have	a	long	history	and	surfaced	regularly	
during	the	time	I	conducted	fieldwork	in	Adamaoua	(July	2003-November	2004).	Adamaoua	is	one	of	
the	country’s	main	cattle	breeding	and	trading	areas.	Cattle	focused	a	large	part	of	German	and	French	
attempts	to	“develop”	this	area.	A	1950	letter	from	the	chef	de	region	aptly	conveys	the	importance	of	
cattle	from	a	revenue	perspective	during	the	colonial	period:	
From	a	fiscal	point	of	view,	the	revenue	that	is	profitably	taxable	is	not	purely	personal	
revenue	but	cattle	revenue.	We	cannot	forget	that	Adamaoua	shelters	around	50,000	humans	
compared	to	the	300,000	head	of	cattle	that	form	the	tax	base	for	the	cattle	tax.	It	would	be	not	
only	unfair	from	a	fiscal	point	of	view	but	even	heavy-handed	(maladroit)	and	inefficient	to	
introduce	any	changes	on	personal	taxation.20		
	
Even	though	Adamaoua’s	economy	has	greatly	expanded	and	diversified	in	the	last	six	decades	
as	a	result,	among	other	factors,	of	becoming	a	major	transport	hub	after	the	completion	of	the	
Transcamerounais	railway	in	1974,	cattle	remains	its	emblematic	cornerstone.	The	protagonist	role	of	
veterinary	officials	in	the	cattle	sector	dates	back	to	the	colonial	era.	As	was	the	case	in	other	French-
controlled	territories	and	contrary	to	what	happened	in	British	colonies,	veterinary	officials	were	
involved	in	spheres	other	than	the	control	of	animal	health,	including	not	only	the	management	and	
improvement	of	pastureland	but	also	the	selection	of	breeds	and	the	regulation	of	markets	and	
commercial	flows	outside	Adamaoua	(Boutrais	2001:	55).	This	colonial	administrative	legacy	was	
																																								 																				
20	ANY	(National	Archives,	Yaoundé)	3AC	6141	Taxe	sur	le	bétail,	Avis	des	chefs	de	régions	sur	l’augmentation,	1950.	
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consolidated	in	the	immediate	postindepedence,	when	Ahmadou	Ahidjo,	the	country’s	first	president,	
created	a	strong	national	professional	corps	(Boutrais	1999:	622).	Jean	Boutrais	reminds	us	that	during	
this	period	the	grid	of	veterinary	services	was	denser	than	that	of	healthcare	for	humans	(ibid.:	609).		
The	first	national	veterinary	doctors	received	training	abroad.21	For	younger	generations,	the	
inauguration	of	the	Centre	de	Formation	Zootechnique,	Vétérinaire	et	Halieutique	(CFZVH)	in	1966	in	
Maroua	(Far	North	Province)	created	the	possibility	of	domestic	training	for	veterinary	assistants	(locally	
known	as	infermiers,	i.e.	nurses).	However,	until	2007	no	national	institution	offered	veterinary	doctor	
degrees,	which	meant	that	the	educational	itineraries	of	those	in	the	higher	echelons	of	MINEPIA	
necessarily	took	them	abroad.22	At	the	time	of	my	research	veterinary	doctors	working	in	Adamaoua	
had	been	trained	in	France,	Senegal,	the	former	Soviet	Union	and	Nigeria.		
To	this	day,	veterinarians	rather	than	administrators,	engineers	or	economists	have	retained	
control	over	MINEPIA.	The	veterinary	profession,	nonetheless,	has	changed	considerably	in	recent	
times.	From	the	mid	1980s,	the	state	was	unable	to	sustain	its	policy	of	automatic	employment	of	
veterinary	professionals.	In	1988,	under	pressure	from	the	World	Bank,	the	government	accepted	in	
principle	a	system	of	private	veterinary	services	delivery	(Gros	1994),	although	the	formal	end	of	state	
monopolies	over	the	exercise	of	the	veterinary	profession	and	over	sales	of	veterinary	products	took	a	
few	more	years.23	This	gradual	process	of	privatization	has	transformed	the	“assistance	contract”	
(Boutrais	1999:	622)	that	linked	the	administration	to	cattle	breeders	and	traders.	Gros	(1994:	47)	notes	
that	in	1991	only	12	out	of	a	total	of	112	Cameroonian	veterinarians	had	set	up	private	practice.	Despite	
the	rhetorical	commitment	to	do	so,	the	state	did	not	materially	support	its	veterinary	officials	to	follow	
																																								 																				
21	This	was	the	case	of	Maikano	Abdoulaye,	who	after	his	studies	in	France,	was	to	become	the	head	the	national	veterinary	
services	in	1966.	Hamadjoda	Adjouji,	the	longest	serving	minister	of	livestock,	also	studied	in	France.	When	the	Dakar	Inter-
State	School	of	Veterinary	Science	and	Medicine	saw	the	light	in	1968,	it	became	an	attractive	option	for	Francophone	
Cameroonians.	Senegal	remains	to	this	day	the	most	common	source	of	degrees	for	Cameroonian	veterinary	doctors.	
22	Based	at	the	University	of	Ngaoundéré	(Adamaoua),	the	École	des	Sciences	et	de	Médecine	Vétérinaire	started	functioning	in	
September	2007.	
23	See,	respectively,	Law	n.	1990/033	of	August	10,	1990;	and	Law	n.	2000/018	of	December	19,	2000.		
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this	course.	They	did	so	either	on	their	own	or	with	the	help	of	international	pharmaceutical	
companies—a	sphere	in	which	the	diverse	educational	itineraries	of	Cameroonian	veterinarians	had	
considerable	repercussions.	The	numbers	of	private	practitioners	have	increased	considerably	since.	In	
2004,	the	city	of	Ngaoundéré	counted	four	private	veterinarians,	three	of	them	operating	as	importers	
of	pharmaceutical	products	as	well.		
The	career	of	most	employees	in	the	tax	administration	is	more	uniform	than	that	of	MINEPIA	
veterinary	officials.	Since	1966,	the	immense	majority	have	gone	through	the	professional	training	and	
socialization	that	the	École	Nationale	d’Administration	et	de	Magistrature	(ENAM)	provides.24	Yet,	even	
today,	senior	positions	are	generally	occupied	by	those	who	have	supplemented	their	studies	abroad,	
often	at	the	French	École	Nationale	d’Administration	or	under	the	supervision	of	international	financial	
institutions.	In	Adamaoua,	the	presence	on	the	ground	of	the	tax	administration	in	the	early	
postindependent	period	was	extremely	thin	and	largely	limited	to	the	city	of	Ngaoundéré.	The	bulk	of	
tax	collection	was	undertaken	by	the	administration	territoriale,	with	sub-prefects	in	protagonist	roles	
and	“traditional	authorities”	serving	as	subordinate	aides.	In	1983,	when	the	status	of	Adamaoua	
changed	from	district	to	province,	the	grid	of	the	tax	administration	became	denser.25	From	then	on,	tax	
officials	took	up	most	audit	and	collection	tasks	at	the	level	of	former	subdistricts	now	upgraded	to	the	
district	status.	In	the	first	half	of	the	1990s,	the	villes	mortes	general	strikes	and	tax	boycott,	which	had	
massive	followings	in	Adamaoua,	alongside	the	severe	economic	crisis,	rendered	the	tax	administration	
practically	inoperative.	It	has	attempted	ever	since	to	recover	the	ground	lost	during	those	years.	The	
previous	section	of	this	article	provides	a	glimpse	of	the	general	context—marked	by	the	informalization	
																																								 																				
24	The	ENAM	was	preceded	by	an	École	Camérounaise	d’Administration,	created	in	27	July	1959,	in	anticipation	of	the	imminent	
bureaucratic	requirements	that	independence	would	bring.		
25	Since	independence	and	up	to	1983,	Adamaoua	was	only	a	district	within	a	vast	North	Province.	Ahidjo’s	successor,	Paul	Biya,	
decided	to	split	northern	Cameroon	into	three	provinces	in	a	move	that	has	been	interpreted	as	an	attempt	to	weaken	his	
predecessor’s	power	base	in	Garoua	(Bayart	1986:	10;	Takougang	and	Krieger	1998:	71-72).	
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of	economic	activity,	limited	administrative	resources,	and	disaffection	of	officials—in	which	this	gradual	
redeployment	of	the	tax	administration	has	taken	place.	
A	September	2004	meeting	held	in	Ngaoundéré	on	the	taxation	of	the	cattle	trade	offers	a	
recent	example	of	the	above-mentioned	tensions	between	MINEFI	and	MINEPIA	officials.	Far	from	being	
a	moment	to	present	a	united	front	against	a	set	of	notoriously	elusive	taxpayers,	it	became	instead	an	
opportunity	for	settling	scores	among	different	local	representatives	of	the	state.	Among	the	few	
grudges	that	the	meeting	allowed	participants	to	vent,	those	of	the	MINEPIA	provincial	delegate	
featured	prominently.	He	reminded	everyone	present	how	the	tax	administration,	as	a	matter	of	course,	
unfairly	accused	MINEPIA	of	stoking	up	breeders’	and	traders’	incivisme	(uncivil	behavior).	It	should	be	
noted	that	since	the	1990s,	the	Cameroonian	government	has	used	the	label	of	incivisme	fiscal	to	
stigmatize	those	who	fail	to	pay	taxes	as	bad	citizens.	This	piece	of	governmental	rhetoric,	translated	as	
“fiscal	disobedience,”	occupies	a	central	place	in	Janet	Roitman’s	work	on	economic	regulation	in	
northern	Cameroon	(Roitman	2005).	To	the	embarrassed	silence	of	the	tax	officials	present,	the	
MINEPIA	delegate	admitted	that,	“Frankly,	I	was	perplexed	to	find	out	that	the	measures	contained	in	[a	
recent]	letter	[from	the	DGI]	were	taken	without	us	being	informed.	I	must	say,	however,	that	we	are	
already	used	to	this	kind	of	practice	on	their	part.”	Once	more,	he	noted,	the	tax	authorities	had	shown	
a	complete	disregard	for	the	role	of	MINEPIA,	“which,	as	you	all	know,	is	held	responsible	for	anything	
involving	cattle.”	With	hindsight,	it	was	perhaps	not	entirely	surprising	that	this	meeting	dramatized	the	
conflicts	between	MINEFI	and	MINEPIA	officials.	Such	occasions	are	few	and	far	between.	A	set	of	new	
measures	aimed	at	tightening	the	tax	authorities’	grip	on	local	cattle	traders	afforded	officials	from	both	
ministries	an	opportunity	to	vent	their	reciprocal	grievances.		
MINEPIA	and	MINEFI	tend	to	have	a	markedly	different	rapport	with	the	main	actors	of	
Adamaoua’s	cattle	economy.	For	a	long	time,	the	top	echelons	in	the	Ministry	of	Livestock	have	been	a	
domain	reserved	for	Adamaoua	politicians.	Foremost	among	them,	Hamadjoda	Adjoudji,	the	minister	at	
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the	time	of	my	stay	in	the	field,	had	held	this	position	for	twenty	years	(1984-2004).26	Even	by	
Cameroon’s	impressive	standards	of	political	longevity,	this	is	a	remarkable	feat	as	well	as	an	extreme	
example	of	the	policy	of	ethnoregional	dosage	(proportioning)	of	government	appointments.	Not	only	is	
the	MINEPIA	hierarchy	identified	with	what	is	popularly	referred	to	as	the	“bloc	Islamo-Peul,”	veterinary	
agents	in	charge	of	the	bulk	of	the	ministry’s	groundwork	are	almost	without	exception	Fulfulde	
speakers.	Even	those	who	did	not	initially	speak	the	language	ended	up	learning	it	in	their	jobs.	Not	
having	minimal	skills	in	Fulfulde,	would	make	their	communication	with	breeders	so	difficult	as	to	
render	their	task	almost	impossible.27	
	By	contrast,	the	majority	of	the	MINEFI	staff	in	the	province	is	from	the	south	of	the	country,	
and	therefore	likely	to	feel	estranged	from	participants	in	the	cattle	economy,	who	are	largely	Fulbe	and	
Hausa	Muslims.	The	over-representation	of	southerners	in	Adamaoua’s	tax	administration	dates	back	to	
early	independence.28	As	far	as	most	political	posts	were	concerned,	however,	President	Ahidjo	adopted	
the	policy	of	appointing	northerners,	and	only	those	who	were	Muslim	or	Islamized.	After	Biya	became	
president	in	1982,	the	pattern	was	reversed	and	southern	governors,	prefects,	and	sub-prefects	
received	appointments	in	the	newly	created	Adamaoua	Province.29	As	Philip	Burnham	(1996:	41)	notes,	
it	soon	became	apparent	that	“southern	dominance	had	simply	been	substituted	for	Fulbe	dominance	in	
access	to	senior	administrative	posts.”30	Even	under	Biya’s	predecessor	Ahidjo,	however,	the	small	
																																								 																				
26	Originally	from	Banyo,	Adjoudji	was	replaced	after	the	October	2004	presidential	elections	by	another	veterinary	doctor	from	
Adamaoua,	Aboubakary	Sarki.	
27	In	fact,	many	MINEPIA	veterinary	assistants	have	been	trained	in	Maroua’s	CFZVH,	where	those	who	have	been	previously	
unexposed	can	quickly	catch	some	Fulfulde.		
28	On	the	ethnic	background	of	tax	officials	in	Ngaoundéré	in	1977,	see	Gondolo	(1978:	94).	
29	Gilbert	Taguem	Fah	(1996:	247-248)	uses	data	from	Alain	Beauvilain’s	doctoral	thesis	(1989:	607-610)	to	reconstruct	the	
religious	background	of	prefects	and	sub-prefects	in	the	north	under	Ahidjo	and	Biya.	In	the	1960-1981	period,	32	prefects	and	
100	sub-prefects	were	Muslims	compared	to	3	prefects	and	10	sub-prefects	who	were	Christian.		In	the	1982-1989,	Christian	
officials	(14	prefects	and	29	sub-prefects)	outnumbered	Muslims	(4	prefects	and	14	sub-prefects).	According	to	Takougang	
(1993:	95-96),	as	of	August	1991,	37	of	47	prefects,	three-fourths	of	the	directors	and	general	managers	of	parastatal	
corporations	in	the	country,	and	22	out	of	38	high	ranking	bureaucrats	who	had	been	appointed	to	the	newly	created	office	of	
the	prime	minister	belonged	to	Biya’s	ethnic	group.	
30	Much	to	the	disillusionment	of	groups	like	the	Gbaya	who	had	hoped	that	the	end	of	Fulbe	control	over	such	posts	might	
mean	greater	political	influence	for	them	in	districts	such	as	the	Mbéré,	where	they	were	majority	(Burnham	1996:	40).	As	
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numbers	of	persons	from	the	north	with	higher	education	meant	that	southerners	occupied	most	of	the	
technical	jobs.	Although	the	number	of	northerners	in	such	positions	has	increased	considerably	since,	
their	small	numbers	in	elite	training	schools,	such	as	the	ENAM,	and	in	technocratic	governmental	and	
parastatal	jobs	is	still	a	commonly	voiced	grievance	against	Biya’s	regime	in	the	north.	MINEFI,	in	any	
case,	has	been	singled	out	by	the	regime’s	critics	as	overwhelmingly	Beti	(Biya’s	ethnic	affiliation).31	The	
senior	tax	official	present	in	the	above-mentioned	September	2004	meeting,	for	instance,	was	one	of	
two	among	more	than	thirty	participants	who	did	not	speak	Fulfulde.	In	fact,	the	MINEPIA	provincial	
delegate,	also	from	Adamaoua,	hinted	at	this	cultural	distance	in	many	of	his	remarks.	Their	respective	
cultural	proximity	and	distance	vis-à-vis	cattle	breeders	and	traders	translate	in	considerable	differences	
between	what	MINEPIA	representatives	and	what	the	tax	authorities	know	about	the	cattle	sector	and	
its	participants.32		As	another	tax	official	explained	to	me	in	an	interview,		
It’s	a	sector	that	the	state	protects	enormously.	We	would	have	liked	to	lay	our	hands	on	
breeders	to	make	them	pay	what	they	should	but	it	is	terribly	difficult.	It’s	certainly	an	
undertaxed	sector.	On	the	one	hand,	there	is	a	problem	of	mentality.	Breeders,	not	only	in	
Adamaoua	but	pretty	much	everywhere,	distrust	the	authorities,	specially	the	tax	authorities.	
On	the	other	hand,	we	lack	the	means	to	go	after	them.	And	MINEPIA,	for	the	most	part,	does	
not	make	our	task	any	easier.	
	
3.	Enhancing	the	“revenue	reliability”	of	the	cattle	sector:	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Burnham	points	out,	“Given	the	substantially	greater	average	educational	level	of	southern	Cameroonians,	the	Biya	
government	has	been	able	to	appoint	‘on	merit’	a	much	greater	proportion	of	southerners	to	administrative	posts	in	the	Mbere	
and	throughout	the	north.	Such	appointments	are	justified	by	their	incumbents	both	as	an	ending	of	Ahidjo’s	policy	of	ethnic	
favoritism	as	well	as	a	furtherance	of	[Biya’s]	RDPC	policies	of	‘renouveau’	and	modernist	socioeconomic	development”	(ibid.:	
174n.11).	
31	In	a	move	that	many	saw	as	an	attempt	to	reverse	such	a	pattern	in	this	province,	an	official	born	in	Adamaoua	was	
appointed	head	of	the	provincial	tax	auditing	services	in	2002,	and	remained	in	this	position	until	2006.	
32	What	insitutionalist	economists	like	to	call	“asymmetries	of	information”	are	made	of	precisely	such	differences,	although	
more	often	than	not	entail	more	than	mere	information.	Marc	Raffinot	(2001:	93)	has	analyzed	these	asymmetries	in	the	
context	of	African	tax	administrations.	However,	he	mainly	considers	those	existing	between	the	tax	administration	and	its	
agents,	on	the	one	hand,	and	between	the	tax	administration	and	taxpayers,	on	the	other.	Here	I	emphasize	the	problems	of	
supervision	and	coordination	between	different	branches	of	the	state	bureaucratic	apparatus.		
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The	PSREP	impinged	on	the	(largely	tolerated	but	unofficial)	privileges	of	MINEPIA’s	veterinary	
agents.33	For	decades,	one	of	the	perks	of	being	posted	to	a	cattle	area	in	Adamaoua	was	the	significant	
income	that	could	be	obtained	from	siphoning	off	part	of	the	revenue	raised	in	their	role	as	tax	and	fee	
collectors.	These	practices	were	widely	known	and	colored	stereotypes	on	the	figure	of	the	docta	na’i	
(cattle	doctor,	a	term	used	for	both	doctors	and	assistants).34	As	a	veterinary	assistant	who	had	worked	
in	Ngaoui	in	the	late	1970s	summed	up,	“Life	on	the	border	with	Central	African	Republic	can	be	tough,	
but	it	was	a	fast	money-saving	job.”	Since	the	late	1980s,	the	late	payment	and	the	diminishing	
purchasing	power	of	salaries	gave	these	funds	renewed	importance	for	MINEPIA’s	officials	to	meet	
expenses.	More	than	ever,	they	needed	to	“prepare	their	retirement,”	as	several	of	my	informants	
phrased	it.		
The	PSREP	acknowledged	a	preexisting	situation	of	widespread	misappropriation	of	public	
moneys	at	the	level	of	MINEPIA	régies	de	recettes	(tax	collection	units).	Neither	one	of	the	two	parties	
whose	cooperation	the	program	required	denied	this	state	of	affairs.	For	example,	one	of	the	top	
officials	in	Adamaoua’s	tax	administration,	while	minimizing	the	financial	import	of	the	taxes	concerned,	
explained	the	program’s	objectives	as	follows:	
Since	the	chefs	de	secteur	(heads	of	cattle	grazing	zones)	work	in	rural	areas	for	the	
most	part,	they	behaved	as	loose	cannons	(en	electron	libre).	They	undertook	the	collection	of	
these	duties,	only	to	put	the	money	in	their	pockets.	The	state	has	decided	to	protect	these	
funds	[against	such	practices]	and	we	have	succeeded.	We	have	multiplied	revenue	from	this	
source	by	three	or	four	(…)	Yet,	it	remains	a	pretty	negligible	sum.	In	any	case,	[to	raise	large	
sums]	was	not	the	[program’s]	goal.	The	goal	was	to	make	sure	that	the	duties	that	a	chef	de	
secteur	collected,	ended	where	they	should.	
	
Similarly,	in	relation	to	the	PSREP’s	targets,	no	one	in	the	local	ranks	of	the	MINEPIA	felt	the	
																																								 																				
33	Olivier	de	Sardan	(2009:	61)	argues	that	the	“privilegism”	of	state	bureaucracies	in	Francophone	West	Africa	has	significant	
colonial	roots.	Along	similar	lines,	Mamadou	Diouf	(2002),	drawing	a	provocative	parallel	with	the	Late	Roman	Empire	as	
analyzed	by	Paul	Veyne,	holds	the	view	that	colonial	rule	in	Africa	left	its	agents	free	to	pursue	“private	advantages”	and	
established	in	practice	“the	right	and	the	power	of	wheeling	and	dealing	in	public	office.”	
34	Projects	such	as	the	fight	against	the	tsetse	fly	(Boutrais	1999)	or	the	promotion	of	the	local	dairy	industry	(Tsapi	2002),	in	
which	the	state	veterinary	agents	played	key	roles,	were	equally	among	those	“areas	of	suspicion”	of	which	Olivier	de	Sardan	
(2009.:	46)	has	written.	
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need	to	beat	about	the	bush.	As	someone	at	their	provincial	offices	told	me,	when	I	asked	him	whether	
there	had	been	winners	and	losers	in	the	program’s	implementation:		
It	is	MINEPIA	that	the	program	has	penalized!	The	aim	was	to	steer	(canaliser)	funds	
that	sometimes	got	lost	[in	the	collection	process],	because	there	were	many	collectors	
involved.	It	was	a	matter	of	the	state	being	able	to	reclaim	(récupérer)	its	own	revenue.	
	
All	the	same,	at	first	the	implementation	of	the	PSREP’s	new	collection	procedures	was	anything	
but	straightforward.	Not	surprisingly,	the	program	ran	against	the	resistance	of	veterinary	agents	on	the	
ground.	In	the	1990s	these	agents	had	seen	their	prerogatives	as	sole	suppliers	of	veterinary	products	
and	services	vanish	under	the	banner	of	liberalization.	According	to	their	testimony,	some	saw	the	
initiative	to	subject	their	tax	collection	tasks	to	MINEFI’s	surveillance	as	the	latest	episode	of	a	full-
fledged	attack	aimed	at	diminishing	their	profession.	Their	bosses	and	their	nonveterinarian	colleagues	
in	MINEPIA	tended	to	have	a	more	circumspect	view.	“After	all,	the	tax	collecting	side	of	their	job,	it	is	
by	accident	that	they	have	come	upon	it,”	one	of	them	told	me.	In	any	case,	resistance	to	the	program	
made	2001	a	remarkably	disappointing	year	in	terms	of	veterinary	taxes	and	fees.	The	vested	interests	
of	municipal	agents	in	charge	of	collecting	market	and	slaughterhouse	duties,	who	were	involved	in	
similar	irregular	practices,	posed	additional	difficulties.		
In	many	respects,	however,	the	veterinary	agents’	battle	was	lost	from	the	start.	The	tax	and	
customs	administrations	would	not	give	up	the	new	remunerative	share	in	the	cattle	economy	to	which	
they	were	now	entitled.	Whereas	before	MINEPIA	had	kept	the	full	amount	of	the	revenue	raised	from	
these	sources,	the	PSREP	decree	rewarded	MINEFI’s	participation	in	the	collection	process	by	allocating	
30	percent	of	that	amount	to	the	Treasury	(MINEPIA	receiving	only	70	percent).		Moreover,	the	tax	
authorities	soon	abandoned	a	maximalist	approach.	According	to	my	informants,	they	realized	that	the	
process	of	getting	a	stranglehold	of	every	single	instance	of	an	individual	pocketing	state	revenue	would	
be	too	costly.	Instead,	they	decided	to	concentrate	their	actions	in	the	markets	they	thought	more	
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promising,	namely	Ngaoundéré,	Likok,	Banyo,	and	Ngaoui.	At	the	time,	the	example	of	Ngaoui	(Mbéré	
District,	next	to	the	Central	African	Republic	border)	was	presented	to	make	a	case	for	the	need	to	unify	
the	collection	services	of	MINEPIA,	customs	and	the	tax	administration.	This	more	pragmatic	approach	
yielded	fruit.	From	July	2001	to	the	end	of	June	2002,	taxes	that	came	under	the	PSREP	mandate	
generated	the	respectable	sum	of	1,800	million	CFA	francs	at	the	national	level,	compared	to	a	mere	
200	million	per	trimester	in	the	previous	fiscal	year	(PRASAC	2003:	77).	
Such	drastic	improvements	in	veterinary	tax	figures	are	not	unprecedented.	In	the	second	half	
of	the	1980s,	for	example,	the	tax	collected	by	the	MINEPIA	provincial	services	rose	significantly.	
Revenue	raised	from	these	sources	went	from	around	42	million	CFA	francs	in	1984-1985	to	over	145	
million	CFA	francs	in	1989-90.	Unlike	the	PSREP,	this	was	an	internal	process	that	did	not	involve	any	
other	ministerial	department.	Indeed,	MINEPIA’s	official	explanation	of	this	change	emphasized	tighter	
control	of	market	transactions	and	not	state	agents’	misappropriation	of	revenue.35	Yet,	MINEPIA’s	
report	for	that	year	also	hinted	at	other	factors:	“Adamaoua	has	not	ceased	to	make	progress	in	the	
collection	and	transfer	(reversement)	of	taxes	to	the	state	coffers.”	36	This	example	supports	the	
argument	that,	in	relation	to	Adamaoua’s	cattle	sector,	state	revenue	generation	goes	through	cyclical	
phases	of	intensification.	
Despite	the	noticeable	improvement	that	the	PSREP	had	induced	by	mid-2002,	important	gaps	
in	the	collection	of	cattle-related	taxes	remained.	Several	incidents	were	aired	in	early	2003.	With	its	
distinctive	reporting	style,	the	state-owned	Cameroon	Tribune	drew	attention	to	the	discrepancy	
between	the	number	of	cattle	traded	and	slaughtered,	and	taxes	collected	in	the	Mbéré	District.	
According	to	this	report,	in	Meiganga	,	where	estimated	levels	of	activity	in	the	cattle	sector	should	have	
																																								 																				
35	This	was	certainly	the	case	in	terms	of	recorded	transactions.	In	1988-1989	sales	in	the	province	markets	had	increased	28.2	
percent	and	shipments	to	the	south	by	31.8	percent,	in	relation	to	the	previous	year.	
36	MINEPIA’s	provincial	archives,	Rapport	Annuel	1988/89,	Délégation	Provinciale	de	l’Elevage	de	l’Adamaoua,	p.91,	my	
emphasis;	see	also	Rapport	Annuel	1990/91,	p.	88.	
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generated	six	million	CFA	francs	in	veterinary	taxes	per	year,	the	municipality	had	never	collected	more	
than	600,000.	In	Dir,	another	municipality	of	this	district	where	“cattle	is	the	unrivalled	backbone	of	the	
economy,”	things	were	“even	more	serious:”	
On	the	occasion	of	a	recent	sub-prefect’s	visit,	voices	rose	crying	out	against	the	harm	
that	this	situation	is	causing	to	the	commune.	Of	five	cattle	markets	in	Dir,	the	tax-collecting	
officer	noted	that	apart	from	the	revenue	coming	from	Dir-Centre,	he	has	never	received	any	
money	from	the	other	veterinary	centers,	that	is	Lokoti,	Badjer,	Bindiba	and	Bagodo.	Who	
specifically	profits	from	veterinary	taxes?	It	is	difficult,	very	difficult	to	tell	with	any	
certainty…since	accusations	are	coming	from	all	sides.	Mayors	accuse	veterinary	agents.	These,	
in	turn,	retort	that	it	is	municipal	officials	in	charge	of	collecting	taxes,	acting	on	mayors’	behalf,	
who	are	to	blame.	In	short,	there	is	some	sort	of	neglect	on	the	part	of	the	authorities	and	a	set	
of	collusive	practices	between	butchers	and	their	partners.37	
	
By	the	time	I	arrived	in	Adamaoua	in	July	2003,	the	readjustment	set	in	motion	by	the	PSREP	
was	by	and	large	a	closed	matter.	Customs	and	tax	officials	in	MINEFI,	who	had	more	at	stake	in	the	
program,	found	the	increased	productivity	of	veterinary	taxes	satisfactory.	MINEPIA	agents	in	the	
province’s	most	important	markets	had	seen	their	income	diminish,	although,	as	far	as	I	could	tell,	they	
had	resigned	themselves	to	it.	Following	a	trend	that	had	already	begun	in	the	previous	decade,	many	
had	found	private	economic	activities	on	the	side	to	make	up	for	these	losses.	Veterinary	agents	who	
supervised	lower-ranked	markets,	where	PSREP	control	was	weak,	still	enjoyed	considerable	flexibility.	
The	main	complaint	MINEPIA	representatives	expressed	about	the	program	was	that	MINEFI,	in	its	role	
of	centralizing	funds	from	this	source,	failed	to	give	MINEPIA	its	corresponding	70	percent	in	a	full	and	
timely	manner.		
The	PSREP	had	strikingly	little	impact	on	the	activities	of	cattle	breeders,	traders,	and	butchers.	
Since	it	was	a	conflict	that	opposed	different	state	officials,	the	program	did	not	change	much	in	their	
way	of	conducting	business.	They	had,	for	the	most	part,	always	paid	the	duties	at	issue	(veterinary	and	
																																								 																				
37	Cameroon	Tribune,	April	3,	2003,	my	translation.	
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market	taxes	and	laissez-passer	fees),	which	were	difficult	to	avoid	anyway.38	Whatever	happened	to	
those	funds	afterward	was	not	their	concern.	Several	told	me	they	feared	that	disgruntled	veterinary	
agents	would	now	interfere	in	their	business.	Most,	however,	reacted	more	positively.	Some	explicitly	
welcomed	the	fact	that	the	taxes	they	were	paying	had	now	started	to	finance	public	spending	rather	
than	the	private	whims	of	civil	servants.		
This	section	has	examined	how	the	implementation	of	the	PSREP	in	Adamaoua	was	a	gradual	
and	negotiated	outcome.	The	following	section	places	the	PSREP	in	a	broader	context	of	administrative	
practice.	It	analyzes	a	segment	of	administrative	action	that,	taking	place	in	a	realm	whose	existence	the	
law	does	not	acknoledge,	has	remained	beyond	the	reach	of	reform.		
	
5.	The	unreformed	taxation	of	cattle	trade	to	Nigeria:		
During	my	fieldwork,	a	man	approached	a	group	of	cattle	traders	in	Ngaoundéré,	who	were	
waiting	for	the	military	escort	to	leave	for	a	rural	market,	and	introduced	himself.	He	was	a	veterinary	
assistant	in	a	village	in	the	Faro-et-Déo	District,	located	on	the	Nigerian	border.	What	had	brought	him	
to	Ngaoundéré,	he	said,	were	the	irregularities	surrounding	cattle	exports	to	Nigeria,	which	he	wanted	
to	report	to	his	superiors	at	the	provincial	level.	Traders	involved	in	this	trade	did	not	have	export	
licenses	nor	did	they	file	import-export	forms	when	they	sent	new	herds	across	the	border.	Instead,	he	
informed	us,	they	made	payments	to	local	authorities	in	the	district’s	administrative	center.	He	even	
quoted	the	stipulated	sums	per	animal	that	the	municipality	and	the	local	chief	received.	None	of	this	
money,	he	claimed,	reached	state	coffers.		
His	alarm	about	the	dimensions	of	this	phenomenon	did	not	impress	the	traders.	As	a	matter	of	
fact,	some	of	them	operated	in	Nigeria.	The	trader	he	had	chosen	to	address	was	quick	to	put	him	in	his	
																																								 																				
38	This	is	not	to	say	that	cattle	transactions	outside	markets,	which	violate	existing	regulations	but	are	a	long-term	feature	of	
the	regional	economy	all	the	same,	came	to	a	halt.	
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place.	Cattle	exports	to	Nigeria	were	“a	reality,”	in	fact	a	very	old	one:		
It	has	been	going	on	for	decades	and	it	won’t	stop.	Then,	it	is	a	question	of	government	
authorities	agreeing	on	what	forms	it	should	take.	You	say	traders	are	behaving	irregularly,	
when	it	is	the	authorities	that	have	encouraged	them	to	proceed	the	way	they	do.	Of	course,	
the	Treasury	is	missing	revenue,	but	who	is	to	blame	for	this?	Is	it	the	traders	who	are	paying	
their	dues,	or	the	officials	who	are	pocketing	the	money?		
	
The	veterinary	agent	was	startled	to	learn	that	those	in	the	higher	echelons	of	MINEPIA	were	
perfectly	aware	of	the	situation.	He	had	heard	that	this	illicit	trade	had	received	the	Faro-et-Déo	
prefect’s	approval,	but	had	never	suspected	that	everyone	else	knew	about	it.	“Everyone	has	given	their	
laissez-passer!,”	retorted	the	trader,	putting	an	end	to	the	conversation.	He	called	a	couple	of	other	
traders	who	operated	across	the	Nigerian	border	and	asked	them	to	exchange	views	with	the	veterinary	
assistant,	which	they	did	reluctantly.	
When	the	veterinary	assistant	finally	left,	his	visit	prompted	a	series	of	observations.	The	trader	
who	had	dealt	with	him	remarked	that	they	must	remain	vigilant.	The	cross-border	cattle	trade	was	an	
extremely	sensitive	issue.	Not	only	did	it	raise	questions	about	Cameroon’s	relationship	with	Nigeria—a	
heated	topic	in	the	aftermath	of	the	dispute	over	the	sovereignty	of	the	Bakassi	peninsula—but	also	
stirred	up	the	specter	of	corruption	by	state	officials.	Others	sounded	more	defiant.	It	was	in	the	interest	
of	local	authorities	not	to	meddle	in	this	“dossier.”	If	these	facts	were	to	be	aired,	they	thought,	traders	
would	have	little	to	fear.	Only	a	naïve	official	who	had	not	served	long	in	his	post,	like	that	veterinary	
assistant,	would	think	of	trying	to	change	the	way	things	worked.	Not	so	naïve,	another	trader	
countered.	If	he	was	acting	like	this,	it	was	only	because	he	had	not	yet	found	the	way	to	obtain	his	own	
cut	in	the	money	being	paid.	Yet	another	trader,	half-jokingly,	went	even	further.	In	his	opinion,	“He	has	
yet	to	realize	he	is	just	the	last	link	[of	the	chain].	If	he	keeps	bothering	his	superiors	and	other	officials,	
he	will	be	transferred	to	a	remote	post	in	the	bush.	If	worse	comes	to	worst,	he	could	be	thrown	into	
the	Faro	[river].”	Everyone	burst	into	laughter.		
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This	chance	encounter	illustrates	how	control	over	economic	activities	such	as	the	cattle	trade	
depends	on	the	combined	efforts	of	a	series	of	individuals	acting	on	behalf	of	the	state.	These	range	
from	the	territorial	representatives	of	the	central	government	(prefects	and	sub-prefects),	to	delegates	
and	other	agents	of	the	relevant	governmental	departments	and	agencies	(MINEPIA,	Ministry	of	
Industrial	Development	and	Commerce,	MINEFI’s	tax	and	customs	administrations),	and	elected	local	
representatives	(mayors),	as	well	as	other	administrative	“assistants”	(chiefs).39	As	this	account	shows,	
there	is	ample	room	for	conflict	and	compromise	among	state	officials	in	their	exercise	of	authority.		
The	cross-border	cattle	trade	from	Adamaoua	to	Nigerian	markets	was	banned	during	the	
colonial	period.40	Yet,	like	in	other	domains,	the	colonial	state	could	not	live	up	to	its	ambitions.	The	
legal	texts	and	administrative	decisions	that	outlawed	these	commercial	flows	were	ineffectual	from	
their	inception	and	the	trade	continued	unabated.	The	postcolonial	state	similarly	held	on	to	the	notion	
that	Adamaoua’s	cattle	should	be	reserved	to	supply	southern	Cameroon	and	thus	refused	to	grant	
export	licenses	to	trade	with	Nigeria.	All	the	same,	it	was	not	in	any	better	position	than	its	predecessor	
to	implement	such	a	prohibition	(Boutrais,	Herrera	and	Bopda	1992:	4).	Routinely	violated,	regulations	
that	subject	this	commerce	to	the	possession	of	licenses	that	are	not	granted	under	any	circumstances,	
are	nonetheless	productive.	They	create	a	whole	sphere	of	illegal	economic	activity,	which,	as	Karine	
Bennafla’s	exemplary	research	on	cross-border	trade	in	Central	Africa	has	shown,	does	not	preclude	
entanglements	between	traders	and	state	officials	(2002).	It	only	colors	them	differently.			
A	taste	of	this	peculiar	dynamic	may	be	obtained	by	looking	back	on	the	September	2004	
meeting	on	the	taxation	of	cattle	trade	discussed	earlier	in	this	article.	An	experienced	trader,	
																																								 																				
39	The	decision	of	some	chiefs	to	openly	get	involved	in	party	politics	has	led	to	cases	of	overlapping	roles.	The	lamido	cum	
mayor	of	Bibémi	(North	Province),	whose	controversial	management	of	Adumri’s	cattle	market	in	1996	has	been	documented	
by	Karine	Bennafla	(2002:	336),	is	an	instance	among	many	others.	Decree	no.	77-245	of	July	15,	1977,	which	regulates	the	
organization	of	chieftaincy,	defines	the	role	of	chiefs	as	auxiliaires	de	l’Administration.		
40	A	1946	arrêté	(ordinance)	forbade	exports	to	both	Nigeria	and	Afrique	Equatorial	Française.	It	did	not,	however,	put	an	end	
to	this	cross-border	trade.	Administrative	records	from	1947	to	1953	even	report	on	its	volume.	The	paradox	of	an	illegal	cross-
border	trade	whose	existence	the	authorities	openly	acknowledged	has	remained	a	constant	up	until	today.	
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particularly	intent	in	explaining	how	traders	were	“on	the	losing	side	every	single	day,”	made	passing	
reference	to	the	fact	that	many	of	them	had	turned	their	efforts	to	the	Nigerian	market.	His	remarks	
elicited	an	immediate	response	from	the	MINEPIA	provincial	delegate,	“But	that	trade	is	not	
authorized!”	Disregarding	the	delegate’s	outburst,	the	trader	continued	his	impassionate	speech.	
Everyone,	it	seemed,	found	the	interruption	either	irrelevant	or	too	trivial.	A	month	later,	I	interviewed	
the	delegate	at	his	office.	He	openly	acknowledged	that	Adamaoua’s	traders	regularly	took	part	in	
“Nigeria’s	circuit	of	parallel	sales”	despite	its	illegality.	Explaining	this	apparent	incongruity,	he	said,	“We	
lack	the	means	to	prevent	it	(…)	Frankly,	once	animals	leave	Ngaoundéré	and	go	back	into	the	bush,	
there	is	little	we	can	do.”	He	glossed	over	the	fact	that	at	border-crossing	points	the	cattle	convoys	
bound	for	Nigerian	markets	are	highly	conspicuous	even	for	an	occasional	visitor	like	me.41	The	
impracticability	of	enforcing	a	cattle	export	ban,	therefore,	does	not	bar	state	officials	on	the	ground	
from	arriving	at	an	understanding	with	those	who	take	part	in	this	trade.42		
The	lack	of	legal	cover	for	these	economic	activities	means	that	concerned	state	officials	are	
constantly	engaged	in	negotiating	their	share,	if	any,	of	the	funds	resulting	from	turning	a	blind	eye	on	
these	exports.	The	understandings	they	reach	among	them	rest	on	fragile	grounds.	They	depend,	in	
turn,	on	a	stable	mutual	understanding	with	traders.	As	the	example	of	the	newly-appointed	veterinary	
assistant	shows,	changes	in	personnel	can	alter	the	existing	balance.	A	story	from	Tignère	(Faro-et-Déo	
District),	which	circulated	widely	while	I	was	doing	fieldwork,	further	illustrates	this	phenomenon.	
According	to	several	testimonies,	in	the	late	1990s	a	newly	appointed	Ministry	of	Industrial	
Development	and	Commerce	(MINDIC)	delegate	for	the	Faro-et-Déo,	who	noticed	that	cross-border	
cattle	exports	went	on	with	impunity,	decided	to	take	matters	into	his	own	hands.	A	former	colleague	of	
																																								 																				
41	During	my	fieldwork,	traders	based	in	Adamaoua	carried	out	most	of	this	trade,	but	some	of	it	was	in	the	hands	of	Nigerian	
traders.	
42	A	recent	report	tells	us:	“As	a	result	of	the	systematic	failure	to	restrict	cattle	circulation	to	designated	trails,	as	well	as	the	
porosity	of	the	Nigerian	border,	customs	cannot	really	control	cattle	flows	towards	this	country.	They	have	to	resign	themselves	
to	the	traders’	verbal	statements	on	the	size	of	the	herds	being	exported,	without	the	possibility	of	verification”	(PRASAC	2003:	
77)	
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his,	prone	to	embellish	stories	for	dramatic	effect,	recounted	the	ensuing	events	to	a	group	of	friends	as	
follows:		
No	sooner	had	[the	MINDIC	district	delegate]	seized	several	herds	to	prevent	them	from	
crossing	the	border,	than	did	the	prefect	turn	up	and	nearly	slap	him.	The	delegate	tried	in	vain	
to	make	him	see	that,	according	to	regulations	in	place,	those	exports	were	not	legal.	The	
prefect	cut	him	short.	He	was	not	to	be	told	what	the	law	was	in	his	district.	The	whole	thing	
was	settled	there	and	then.	The	delegate	sent	a	report	to	his	superior	(the	MINDIC	provincial	
delegate)	and	kept	silent	thereafter.	
	
Events	unfolding	outside	Adamaoua	can	also	upset	the	conduct	of	business	at	the	Nigerian	
border.	For	example,	a	2001	conflict	over	the	presence	of	unauthorized	Chadian	and	Central	African	
traders	in	Yaoundé’s	cattle	market	was	settled,	among	other	things,	with	a	circular	note	from	the	
minister.	This	note,	dated	July	4,	2001,	called	MINEPIA	officials’	attention	to	“the	massive	presence	of	
foreign	traders,”	despite	the	fact	that	“no	formal	regulation	[of	their	activities]	exists.”	The	minister	
further	urged	them	“to	take	measures	to	put	an	end	to	[it],”	to	ensure	that	“the	[beef]	demand	of	the	
country’s	consumption	centers	is	satisfied.”43	Though	trade	on	Adamaoua’s	border	with	Nigeria	was	not	
specifically	mentioned,	the	circular	note	resulted	in	MINEPIA’s	officials	taking	a	harsher	approach	to	
cattle	exports	from	Adamaoua.	This	translated	into	threats	of	cattle	confiscation,	and,	presumably,	
bribes.	The	ministerial	note	did	not	end	the	economic	game	that	stood	outside	“formal	regulation”	but	
instead	led	to	a	renegotiation	of	the	pragmatic	norms	that	allowed	for	the	game	to	go	on,	with	the	state	
agents	taking	a	larger	unofficial	fee.		
*			*			*			*			*			*			*	
The	PSREP	and	the	difficulties	it	encountered	on	the	ground	constitute	a	salutary	reminder	of	
the	patchiness	of	public	authority	in	regions	and	domains	of	activity	where	uncoordinated	state	action	is	
pervasive.	By	involving	the	tax	administration	in	the	collection	and	handling	of	revenue	that	had	in	the	
																																								 																				
43	In	protest	against	the	increased	presence	of	foreign	traders,	Adamaoua’s	traders	had	decided	on	halting	their	supplies	to	
Yaoundé.	
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past	been	the	exclusive	responsibility	of	MINEPIA,	this	program	pushed	two	sets	of	state	officials	to	
work	together.	The	PSREP	is	shown	in	this	light	as	a	multifaceted	undertaking	through	which	the	
inhabitants	of	two	islands	in	the	Cameroonian	“administrative	archipelago”	are	forced	out	of	the	inertia	
of	minding	their	own	business.	The	image	of	“administrative	archipelago”	surfaces	in	Jean	Copans’	
critical	reflection	on	the	links	between	the	historical	junctures	of	African	politics	and	the	analytical	
models	developed	to	make	sense	of	them.	In	the	present	political	context,	Copans	(2001:	14)	argues,	it	
is	not	entirely	surprising	that	the	state	administration	appears	as	a	collection	of	islands	“isolated	from	
each	other,	where	the	multiplicity	of	local	and	intermediate	dynamics	bring	into	question	both	the	
centeredness	of	administrative	management	and	the	notion	of	national	corps	of	civil	servants.”	The	
PSREP	entailed	both	bridging	the	gap	between	two	professional	repertoires	and	reconciling	competing	
claims	to	service	“privatization”	(the	program’s	not-so-hidden	face),	while	minimally	fulfilling	the	
program’s	revenue	targets	(its	“white	paper”	version).	The	cooperation	between	these	two	
administrative	agencies,	which	this	program	not	only	called	for	but	took	for	granted,	meant	a	
realignment	of	their	respective	spheres	of	influence	that	was	only	achieved	gradually	through	a	
pragmatic	reformulation	of	the	program’s	goals.		
However,	an	analysis	of	the	PSREP	in	its	own	terms,	with	its	focus	on	relationships	between	tax	
officials	and	veterinary	agents,	runs	the	risk	losing	sight	of	a	broader	universe	of	administrative	
practice.44	A	look	into	the	unofficial	regulation	of	the	cattle	trade	to	Nigeria	helps	reconstruct	the	
general	contours	of	such	a	universe,	whereby	public	authority	results	from	a	more	complex	dynamic	in	
which	authorities	such	as	prefects,	mayors,	and	chiefs,	as	well	as	a	whole	array	of	non-state	actors	take	
part.	No	matter	how	ambitious	the	reforms	under	way	in	Cameroon	and	other	sub-Saharan	African	
																																								 																				
44	An	added	effect	of	the	analytical	priority	given	to	the	comparison	between	MINEPIA	and	tax	administration	officials	is	this	
article’s	relative	neglect	of	the	internal	hierarchies	and	factions	(in	whose	formation	professional	rank,	educational	itinerary,	
gender,	age,	class,	ethnicity,	language,	or	religion	may	play	a	part)	existing	within	each	of	these	two	administrative	units,	which	
have	considerable	weight	of	their	everyday	operation.	
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countries	may	be,	the	ebbing	tide	of	state	control	over	the	economy	depends	on	precarious,	ambivalent	
and	often	reversible	agreements	among	these	actors	that	involve	varying	degrees	of	avoidance,	
accommodation,	cooperation,	negotiation,	resistance,	and	conflict.	
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